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  on	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  of	  Robotics	  
from	  the	  New	  Far-­‐Side	  of	  the	  Law	  
	  
Aurora	  Voiculescu	  
Law	  &	  Theory	  Lab,	  Faculty	  of	  Social	  Sciences	  and	  Humanities,	  
University	  of	  Westminster,	  London	  	  	  The	   thought-­‐provoking	   EPSRC	   Principles	   of	   Robotics	   stem	   largely	   from	   the	   reflection	   on	   the	  extent	   to	  which	   robots	   can	   affect	   our	   lives.	   These	   comments	   highlight	   the	   fact	   that,	   while	   the	  Principles	  may	  address	  to	  a	  good	  extent	  the	  present	  technological	  challenges,	  they	  appear	  to	  be	  less	  immediately	  suited	  for	  future	  technological	  and	  conceptual	  dares.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  paper	  is	  dedicated	  to	  the	  search	  of	  the	  definition	  of	  what	  a	  robot	  is.	  Such	  a	  definition	  should	  offer	  the	  basic	  conceptual	  platform	  on	  which	  a	  normative	  endeavour,	  aiming	  to	  regulate	  robots	  in	  society,	  should	  be	  based	  on.	  Concluding	  that	  the	  Principles	  offer	  no	  clear	  yet	  flexible	  insight	  into	  such	  a	  (meta-­‐)definition,	   which	   would	   allow	   one	   to	   take	   into	   account	   the	   parameters	   of	   informed	  technological	   imagination	   and	  of	   envisaged	   social	   transformation,	   the	   second	  half	   of	   the	  paper	  highlights	  a	  number	  of	  regulatory	  points	  of	  tension.	  Such	  tensions,	  it	  is	  argued,	  stem	  largely	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  an	  appropriate	  conceptual	  platform,	  influencing	  negatively	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	  Principles	  can	  be	  effective	  in	  guiding	  social,	  ethical,	  legal	  and	  scientific	  conduct.	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1.	   Introduction	  	  The	   thought-­‐provoking	   EPSRC	   Principles	   of	   Robotics	   initiative	   (EPSRC,	   2010)	  (hereinafter	   referred	   to	   as	   EPSRC	   PRs	   or	   simply	   PRs)	   stems	   largely	   from	   the	  reflection	  on	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  robots	  already	  affect	  our	  lives	  and	  on	  the	  even	  greater	  extent	  to	  which	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  they	  will	  affect	  it	  in	  the	  relatively	  near	  future	  (Roser,	  2016).1	  It	   is	  understood	  that	   the	   initiative	  represents	  an	  attempt	  to	  address	  public	  anxieties	  related	  to	  the	  future	  of	  human-­‐robot	  interactions.	  The	  principles,	  therefore,	  aim	  to	  reassure	  the	  public	  concerning	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  the	   advantages	   of	   using	   increasingly	   sophisticated	   robots,	   in	   a	   variety	   of	  contexts,	   are	   not	   going	   to	   be	   outweighed	   by	   disadvantages.2	  The	   agenda	   to	   be	  fulfilled	   by	   the	   principles	   is	   thus	   one	   that	   combines	   both	   the	   safety	   and	   the	  acceptability	  of	  robotic	  technology,	  supporting	  the	  governmental	  policy	  towards	  making	  robotics	  a	   technology	  of	   critical	   importance	   for	   the	  UK	  (Bryson,	  2012).	  	  The	   question	   of	   whether	   the	   initial	   regulation	   related	   to	   this	   transformative	  technology	   should	   take	   the	   shape	   of	   soft,	   guiding	   principles,	   of	   hard	   domestic	  legal	  instruments,	  or	  even	  of	  complex	  international	  treaties	  is	  a	  challenging	  yet,	  at	  this	  point,	  a	  secondary	  issue.	  The	  primary	  issue	  is,	  rather,	  a	  (legal-­‐)	  normative	  one,	   aimed	   at	   delineating	   clear	   boundaries	   of	   the	   human-­‐robot	   co-­‐existence;	  addressing	   the	   normative	   dynamics	   of	   causality,	   intentionality	   and	  responsibility;	   trying	   to	   identify	   the	   locus	   of	   intention	   and	   action	   in	   processes	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and,	   dare	   we	   say,	   relationships	   that	   may	   well	   prove	   to	   become	   increasingly	  complex	  with	  the	  advancement	  of	  science	  and	  technology	  (Voiculescu,	  2016).	  	  Stemming	  from	  this	  need	  for	  normative	  introspection,	  this	  paper	  is	  an	  invitation	  to	   reflection	   on	   the	   proposed	   Principles	   of	   Robotics	   coming	   out	   of	   the	   multi-­‐disciplinary	   expert-­‐informed	   EPSRC	   and	   AHRC	   Robotics	   Retreat	   in	   2010.	   The	  complexity	  of	  issues	  to	  cover	  is	  such	  that	  these	  reflections	  can	  only	  aim	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  text	  of	  what	  is	  proposed,	  prising	  out	  some	  of	  the	  possible	  meanings	  or	  interpretations	   available	   there.	   Such	   an	   analysis	   is	   proposed	   as	   essential	   for	  preparing	  the	  ground	  for	  further	  discussions,	  and	  finally,	   for	  embarking	  on	  any	  eventual	  regulatory	  processes.	  	  	  
2.	   Principles	  in	  Search	  of	  a	  Definition	  	  Reflecting	  on	  the	  existing	  principles	  does	  invite	  one,	  first	  of	  all,	  to	  address	  what	  a	  robot	   is	   and	   to	   decide	   whether	   the	   definition	   that	   one	   should	   settle	   for	   and,	  therefore,	   the	   type	   of	   entities	   or	   phenomena	   that	   one	   should	   aim	   to	   regulate,	  should	  be	  an	  answer	  to	  our	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐art	   in	   technology	  or	  a	  reflection	  of	  our	  state-­‐of-­‐the-­‐(technology)	  in	  art.	  In	  other	  words,	  on	  which	  point	  on	  the	  spectrum	  between	   science	   and	   (informed)	   imagination	   should	  we	   place	   ourselves	  when	  designing	   norms	   to	   govern	   technological	   advances	   and	  when	   evaluating	   these	  norms’	  effectiveness?	  How	  far	   into	  the	  future	  should	  one	   look,	  when	  the	  future	  for	  which	  we	   regulate	   is	   so	   far	   that	  we	   can	   only	   speculate	   as	   to	   its	   existence,	  while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   we	   are	   galloping	   towards	   that	   very	   future	   at	   an	   ever	  greater	  speed	  (Roser,	  2016)?	  	  	  Law	  and	  regulation,	  hard	  or	  soft,	   requires,	  even	   thrives	  on	  definitions.	   It	   is	   the	  law’s	  way	   of	   incorporating	   a	   phenomenon	   into	   its	   reality,	   since	   a	   definition	   is	  never	  value-­‐neutral,	  but	  always	  establishes	  the	  ‘in’-­‐s	  and	  the	  ‘out’-­‐s,	  following	  a	  more	   or	   less	   declared	   value-­‐laden	   path	   (Norrie,	   1991,	   p.	   687).	   The	   EPSRC	  Principles	   under	   discussion	   here	   do	   not	   immediately	   send	   to	   a	   definition,	  although	  they	  do	  offer	  a	  number	  of	  elements	  of	  what	  robots	  ought	  to	  be	  seen	  as:	  ‘tools’	   (PR1),	   ‘products’	   (PR3);	   ‘not	   responsible	   agents’	   (PR2);	   ‘just	   tools,	  designed	   to	   achieve	   goals	   and	   desires	   that	   humans	   specify’	   (commentary	   to	  PR2);	   ‘simply	   not	   people’,	   ‘pieces	   of	   technology’	   (commentary	   to	   PR3);	  ‘manufactured	  artefacts’	  (PR4).	  Robots,	  however,	  cover	  a	  rather	  wide	  spectrum,	  the	  AI	   that	  powers	   them	  can	  vary	   from	  the	  very	  basic	   to	   the	  very	  complex	  and	  the	  current	  principles	  appear	  to	  cover	  only	  partially	  this	  spectrum.	  	  	  If	   we	   look	   outside	   of	   the	   EPSRC	   document	   for	   an	   existing	   definition	   that	  may	  have	   been	   taken	   for	   granted,	   we	   are	   not	   going	   to	   find	   much	   help.	   A	   robot	   is	  defined	  in	  many	  different	  ways.	  Some	  dictionaries	  define	  it	  as	  ‘a	  machine	  capable	  
	   3	  
of	  carrying	  out	  a	  complex	  series	  of	  actions	  automatically’	  or,	  differently	  nuanced,	  as	  ‘a	  mechanical	  or	  virtual	  artificial	  agent,	  usually	  an	  electro-­‐mechanical	  machine	  that	  is	  guided	  by	  a	  computer	  program	  or	  electronic	  circuitry’	  (“Merriam-­‐Webster	  Dictionary,”	   2016).	   Various,	   more	   or	   less	   workable	   distinctions	   are	   also	   put	  forward	  as	  part	  of	  other	  definitions;	  more	  notably	  one	  encounters	  the	  distinction	  between	  industrial	  and	  service	  machines,	  between	  highly	  autonomous	  machines	  and	   cognitive	   computer	   programmes,	   between	   embodied	   and	   dis-­‐embodied	  cognition	  entities,	  to	  mention	  just	  some	  of	  the	  most	  widely	  available	  distinctions.	  NASA	   itself	   uses	   a	   rather	  mundane	   and	   imprecise	   language,	   very	  unhelpful	   for	  the	   regulator,	   defining	   robots	   as	   ‘machines	   that	   can	   be	   used	   to	   do	   jobs’.	   Some	  robots,	  NASA’s	   formulation	   goes	  on,	   ‘can	  do	  work	  by	   themselves.	  Other	   robots	  must	  always	  have	  a	  person	  telling	  them	  what	  to	  do’	  (NASA,	  2015).	  Such	  a	  variety	  of	   formulations	   creates	   a	   regulatory	   minefield	   and	   makes	   any	   stemming	  normative	  statements	  difficult	  to	  follow	  and	  easy	  to	  avoid	  complying	  with.	  	  	  While	  agreeing	   that	   there	   is	  no	  agreed	  definition	  per	  se	   (Wilson,	  2015),	  certain	  other	  attempts	  put	  forth	  a	  number	  of	  features	  that	  a	  robot	  would	  have,	  features	  that,	   from	   a	   regulatory	   (and	   not	   only)	   perspective,	   are	   themselves	   in	   need	   of	  definitions:	   sensing	   the	   surroundings	   (having	   inbuilt	   ‘awareness’	   of	   its	  environment);	  movement,	  whether	  rolling,	  walking,	  thrusting,	  or	  maybe	  even	  just	  data-­‐conveying;	  energy,	   being	   able	   to	  power	   itself	   in	  ways	   that	  will	   depend	  on	  what	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  robot	  is;	  intelligence:	  being	  provided	  with	  ‘smarts’	  by	  its	  programmer,	   having	   the	   capacity	   to	   evaluate	   surroundings,	   circumstances,	  complex	  information.	  	  	  A	   robot	   is,	   therefore,	   defined	   more	   specifically	   as	   a	   system,	   a	   machine	   that	  ‘contains	   sensors,	   control	   systems,	  manipulators,	   power	   supplies	   and	   software,	  all	  working	   together	   to	  perform	  a	   task’	   (Merzouki,	  Samantaray,	  Pathak,	  &	  Ould	  Bouamama,	  2013,	  p.	  619).	  According	  to	  such	  a	  perspective,	  ‘[d]esigning,	  building,	  programming	   and	   testing	   a	   robot	   is	   a	   combination	   of	   physics,	   mechanical	  engineering,	   electrical	   engineering,	   structural	   engineering,	   mathematics	   and	  computing.	  In	  some	  cases	  biology,	  medicine,	  chemistry	  might	  also	  be	  involved’.	  If	  the	   student	   in	   robotics	   may	   actively	   engage	   with	   all	   of	   these	   disciplines	   ‘in	   a	  deeply	   problem-­‐posing	   problem-­‐solving	   environment’	   (Wilson,	   2015),	   some	  could	   rightly	   say	   that	   regulating	   robots	   and	   the	   robot-­‐human	   interactions	  requires	  a	  similarly	  complex	  interdisciplinary	  engagement	  with	  most	  if	  not	  all	  of	  these	   fields.	   For	   the	   normative	   discourse,	   whether	   hard	   regulatory	   or	   soft-­‐principled,	   the	   fact	   that	  many	   of	   these	   definitions	   have	   a	   number	   of	   points	   in	  common	   is	   not	   sufficient	   for	   securing	   consistency	   and	   generality	   in	   the	  application	  of	  the	  eventual	  principles.	  	  	  One	  of	   the	  main	  challenges	  and	  aims	  of	   robotics	   is	   to	  create	  machines	   that	  are	  capable	  of	  independently	  interacting	  with	  a	  dynamic	  world.3	  Scaling-­‐up,	  moving	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towards	   a	   human-­‐like	   level	   of	   intelligence	  will	   take	   the	  machine	   past	   the	   easy	  classification	   stage,	   since	   scientists	   are	   already	   looking	   into	   robot	   intelligence	  architectures	  that	  eschew	  traditional	  pre-­‐programming	  as	  a	  solution	  to	  meeting	  the	  ‘human-­‐like’	  goalpost.	  	  It	  appears,	  therefore,	  that	  the	  essence	  of	  a	  robot,	  so	  to	  speak,	  is	  either	  taken	  for	  granted	  –	  not	  a	  very	  useful	  platform	  for	  a	  regulator	  to	  start	  from	  -­‐	  or	  is	  defined	  through	  what	  the	  robot	  contains	  (or	  not)	  and	  how	  it	  is	  made,	  rather	  than	  through	  what	   a	   robot	   actually	   is	   and	  potentially	  may	  be.	   If	  we	  add	   to	   this	   the	   tendency	  towards	  legal-­‐normative	  reductionism,	  that	  is	  the	  tendency	  of	  the	  law	  to	  look	  at	  a	  phenomenon	  through	  pre-­‐existing	  legal	  conceptual	  constructions	  from	  within	  its	  own	   environment,	   the	   ontological	   reality	   of	   the	   new	   technologies	   are	   going	   to	  struggle	   to	  be	  acknowledged.	  The	  new	   technology	  has	   to	   interact	  with	  a	   social	  and	   legal	   world	   that	   is	   already	   in	   place,	   thus	   displaying	   conceptual	   and	  normative	  inertia	  (Balkin,	  2015,	  p.	  50).	  	  A	   definition	   that	   is	   sufficiently	   precise,	   yet	   dynamic	   enough	   to	   capture	   the	  essence	  of	  the	  socio-­‐technological	  phenomena	  is,	   therefore,	  needed	  for	  opening	  the	   robotics	   principles	   to	   further	   development	   and	   problematisation	   and,	  ultimately,	   for	   allowing	   a	  more	   complex	   conceptualisation	   of	   the	   human-­‐robot	  interaction	  (Kahn	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  This	  need	  relates	  to	  perspectives	  such	  as	  the	  one	  highlighted	  by	  Andra	  Keay,4	  who	  speaks	  about	  robots	  as	  ‘…	  an	  environment;	  too	  large	   for	  us	   to	   look	  at	   as	   an	   item’.	  While	   inevitably	   linked	   to	   the	  progresses	  of	  technology	  –	   ‘[what]	  we	  call	  a	   robot	   today	   is	  more	  sophisticated	   than	  what	  we	  called	  a	  robot	  in	  the	  ’80s’	  says	  Keay	  -­‐	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  a	  robot	  is	  more	  than	  that.	  ‘It	  has	  always	  been	  an	  identity	  issue’	  Keay	  declares	  (Brewster,	  2014).	  From	  such	  a	  position,	  it	  is	  understandable	  that	  any	  soft	  or	  hard	  regulatory	  initiative	  is	  bound	  to	   be	  met	   with	   a	   rather	   steep	   challenge	   of	   capturing	   the	   essence	   of	   a	   rapidly	  changing	   environment.	   Unsurprisingly,	   the	   concern	   is	   that	   the	   technological	  advances	  are	  taking	  place	  at	  such	  a	  speed	  and	  with	  such	  opacity	  that	  it	  will	  take	  hold	   of	   our	   lives,	   our	   privacy,	   our	   emotions,	   ‘before	   our	   governments	   and	   our	  laws	  are	  ready	  for	  it’	  (Barraza,	  2016).	  	  While	   this	   special	   medium	   awaiting	   normative	   ordering	   brings	   its	   own	  challenges,	   it	   should	   be	   said,	   however,	   that	   identities	   and	   classifications	  encapsulated	   in	   definitions	   –	   the	   law’s	   bread	   and	   butter	   -­‐	   have	   often	   been	  problematic	   when	   promoted	   as	   part	   of	   regulatory	   initiatives	   and	   are	   almost	  always	  problematised	  when	  put	  forth	  on	  a	  dispute	  resolution	  platform,	  whether	  these	   definitions	   have	   to	   do	   with	   humans	   or	   non-­‐humans	   alike.	   Law,	   in	  particular,	  always	  ends	  up	  transforming	  any	  identity	  into	  a	  legal	  fiction	  that	  often	  has	  very	  little	  to	  do	  with	  any	  other	  physical	  or	  scientific	  dimension	  of	  that	  entity	  (Fagundes,	   2001).	   Yet,	   law	   -­‐	   in	   its	   widest	   sense,	   as	   socially	   backed	   normative	  imperatives	   -­‐	   has	   always	   thrived	   on	   definitions.	   The	   absence	   of	   a	   working	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definition	  of	  a	  robot,	  conveying	  flexible	  yet	  coherent	  complexity,	  to	  be	  eventually	  incorporated	   into	  a	  preamble	  of	   the	  normative	  document,	  appears	  to	  be	  both	  a	  witness	  to	  the	  challenges	  of	  pinning	  down	  technology	  in	  its	  rush,	  and	  a	  reflection	  of	   a	   possible	  weakness	   to	   be	   addressed	   in	   the	   proposed	   document.	   Of	   course,	  once	  formulated	  and	  placed	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  normative	  initiative,	  a	  definition	  may	  be	  contested	  and	  problematized.	  However,	  this	  does	  not	  make	  the	  definition	  any	  less	  of	  a	  necessity	  as	  a	  key	  normative	  coagulation	  point.	  	  Last	   but	   not	   least,	   in	   addition	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   agreed	  working	   definition,	  there	   is	   also	   the	   acknowledgement	   that,	   as	   mentioned	   earlier,	   definitions	   are	  never	   neutral	   and,	   it	   could	   be	   argued,	   nor	   is	   their	   absence.	   Scholars,	   already	  decades	  ago,	  brought	  this	  idea	  to	  bear	  on	  defining	  the	  responsibility	  of	  corporate	  organisations	  as	  collective	  agencies	  (Voiculescu,	  2017).	  Since	  this	  normative	  and	  legal	   innovation	   takes	   the	   notion	   of	   responsibility	   beyond	   the	   sphere	   of	   the	  discrete	   individual	   human	  being,	   it	   also	   touches	   on	  our	  discussion	  here.	  While	  the	   absence	   of	   key	   definitions	   leaves	   the	   normative	   space	   prey	   to	   being	  populated	  by	  the	  hegemonic	  discourse-­‐setting	  voices,	  the	  provision	  of	  definitions	  advances	  pseudo-­‐unities	   that	   are	  proposed	   as	   facts.	   Such	  pseudo-­‐unities	   set	   up	  oppositions	  that	  ‘arbitrarily	  separate	  those	  who	  are	  included	  and	  those	  who	  are	  excluded	   from	  a	   shared	   conceptualisation	  or	  practice’	   (May,	  1996,	  p.	  171ff).	   In	  the	  case	  of	  robotics,	  such	  arbitrariness	  of	  definitions	  will	  become	  more	  and	  more	  evident	  with	  the	  passing	  of	  time,	  once	  the	  AI	  spectrum	  is	  enlarged	  (Grady,	  2014).	  Treading	   between	   a	   definitional	   vacuum	   and	   pseudo-­‐unities,	   the	   reflection	   on	  definitions	   ought,	   therefore,	   to	   be	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   any	   normative	   principles	   for	  robotics.	  	  
3.	   Principles	  in	  Practice	  	  Whether	  anticipated	  with	  dread	  or	  with	  excitement,	  the	  challenges	  of	  regulating	  the	   multiple	   dimensions	   of	   the	   human-­‐robot	   interactions	   are	   significant.	   A	  number	  of	  issues	  are	  put	  forward	  here	  for	  reflection	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  five	  EPSRC	  Principles	  of	  Robotics,	  issues	  deriving	  more	  or	  less	  directly	  from	  the	  absence	  of	  clearer	  definitions	  and	  a	  clearer	  regulatory	  conceptual	  framework.	  	  In	   an	   attempt	   to	   maybe	   promote	   their	   commonness	   and	   enhance	   their	  acceptability,	  the	  PRs	  declare	  robots	  to	  be	  (simply)	  multi-­‐use	  tools,	  (PR1):	  Robots	  
are	   multi-­‐use	   tools.	   Robots	   should	   not	   be	   designed	   solely	   or	   primarily	   to	   kill	   or	  
harm	  humans,	  except	  in	  the	  interest	  of	  national	  security.	  While	  the	  principle	  aims	  to	  be	  simple	  and	  clear,	  it	  should	  also	  be	  effective	  in	  guiding	  conduct,	  and	  this	  is	  where	  the	  principle	  may	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  less	  than	  ideal.	  First	  of	  all,	  as	  a	  safety-­‐centred	  principle,	   PR1	  appears	   rather	   confusing.	  Declaring	   robots	   as	   ‘multi-­‐use	  
tools’	  is	  virtually	  a	  dimension	  that	  does	  not	  serve	  an	  actual	  purpose.	  It	  is	  unclear	  why	  a	  robot	  has	  to	  be	  multi-­‐use	  in	  order	  to	  be	  safe	  or,	  conversely,	  in	  what	  way	  an	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otherwise	   deadly	   robot	  may	   become	   any	   less	   deadly	   if	   designed	   as	  multi-­‐use.	  This	  relates	  to	  the	  next	  part	  of	  the	  principle:	  ‘robots	  should	  not	  be	  designed	  solely	  
or	   primarily	   to	   kill	   or	   harm	   humans‘.	   Were	   one	   to	   actually	   aim	   to	   build	   ‘killer	  robots’,	  in	  order	  to	  bring	  such	  an	  aim	  to	  compliance	  with	  the	  letter	  of	  the	  above	  principle,	   it	  would	  suffice	  to	  teach	  such	  robots	  not	  only	  to	  kill	  but	  also	  to	  make	  pancakes	  or	  knit	  woolly	  socks.	   In	   the	  absence	  of	  over-­‐arching	  clear	  definitions,	  the	   principle	   allows	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   what	   one	   would	   call	   a	   ‘creative-­‐compliance	   loophole’.	   In	   order	   to	   identify	   and	  use	   such	   a	   loophole,	   a	   legal	   eye	  needs	   to	   look	   no	   further	   than	   to	   a	   literal	   interpretation	   of	   the	   text.	   Such	   an	  interpretation	   is	  one	  of	   the	  primary	  rules	  of	   interpretation	   in	   law,	   in	  particular	  when	   the	   interpretation	  enabled	  by	   the	  spirit	  of	   the	  set	   rule	  may	  not	  bring	   the	  desired	   outcome.	   Since	   they	   fail	   to	   acknowledge	   the	   distinction	   between	  what	  robots	   can	   be	   and	   what	   robots	   ought	   to	   be,	   the	   explanations	   given	   to	   this	  principle	  in	  the	  2010	  original	  document	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  really	  address	  this	  rather	  basic	   approach	   to	   interpreting	   rules	   and	   its	   potential	   consequences.	   This,	  unfortunately,	   is	   bound	   to	   render	   the	   principle	   ineffective	   as	   a	   normative	   rule	  destined	  to	  guide	  conduct.	  	  The	  commentary	  published	  at	  the	  time	  in	  connection	  to	  this	  principle	  points	  to	  other	   potential	   pitfalls	   for	   normative	   reasoning.	   As	  mentioned	  with	   respect	   to	  ‘multi-­‐use	   tools’,	   there	   is,	   for	   instance,	   an	  attempt	   to	  put	   forward	   the	   idea	   that	  robots	  are	   tools	   like	  any	  others.	   In	  order	   to	  pursue	   this	   logic,	   equivalences	  are	  sought	  at	  any	  cost,	  by	  comparing	  a	  robot	  with	  a	  knife	  or	  a	  gun	  used	  for	  different,	  both	   relatively	  benign	  and	  criminal	  purposes.	  However,	   all	   indications	  are	   that	  robots	   are	   not	   tools	   like	   any	   other	   and	   this	   is	   precisely	   why	   our	   conceptual	  frameworks	   about	   agency,	   intentionality,	   responsibility,	   humanity	   even,	   are	  challenged	   and,	   ultimately,	   this	   is	   also	   the	   source	   for	   our	   social	   unease	   about	  robots.	  	  	  Moreover,	  very	  dangerously,	  the	  principle	  accepts	  the	  use	  of	  robots	  for	  military	  purposes	  as	  an	  inevitability.	  As	  a	  public	  relations	  exercise,	  this	  is	  not	  meant	  to	  be	  very	   reassuring.	   Allowing	   robots	   to	   be	   developed	   and	   used	   ‘in	   the	   interest	   of	  
national	   security’	   appears	   as	   an	   indirect	   acknowledgement	   that	   regulating	   the	  use	   of	   robots	   created	   for	   violence	   against	   humans	   is	   very	   difficult,	   even	  impossible,	  to	  achieve.	  One	  can	  only	  imagine	  the	  consequence	  of	  such	  loophole-­‐ridden	  reasoning	  in	  a	  normative	  context	  such	  as,	  for	  instance,	  the	  one	  supported	  by	  the	  First	  Amendment	  in	  the	  US	  or	  on	  the	  wider	  international	  arena.	  While	  one	  can	   acknowledge	   the	   drafters’	   decision	   to	   remain	   realistic	   about	   governments’	  decisions	   on	   the	   use	   of	   robots,	   especially	   in	   the	   context	   in	   which	   robots	   are	  already	  being	  used	  by	   the	  military,	   it	  would	  have	  been	  highly	  desirable	   for	   the	  draft	  to	  display	  more	  courage	  in	  addressing	  the	  potential	  dangers	  brought	  about	  by	  advanced	  highly	  autonomous	  robots	  used	  for	  military	  purposes.	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However,	   a	   clearer	   definition,	   addressing	   the	   spectrum	   of	   AI-­‐endowed	   robots,	  would	  have	  been	  more	  adequate	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  extreme	  potential	  for	  harm	   that	   such	   robots	   may	   bring,	   and	   this	   might	   have	   been	   instrumental	   in	  emphasising	   their	   use	   as	   weapons	   as	   being	   highly	   undesirable,	   based	   on	   the	  precautionary	  principle	   (Gevel	  &	  Noussair,	   2013,	  p.	   40;	  Nemetz,	  2013,	  p.	   185).	  The	  danger	  of	  using	  sophisticated	  robots	  for	  violent,	  aggressive	  goals	  is	  so	  great	  (Knight,	  2015)	  that,	   like	  the	  use	  of	  nuclear	  technology	  for	  weaponry,	  or	  the	  use	  of	   chemical	   and	   biological	   weapons,	   it	   should	   be	   strongly	   discouraged	   as	   a	  matter	  of	   principle.	   Even	   if	   this	  use	  were	  not	   to	  be	   totally	   forbidden,	   a	   clearer	  definition	  of	  what	  machines	  one	   is	   talking	  about	  would,	   again,	   be	  very	  helpful.	  The	   ‘national	   security’	   argument,	   for	   instance,	   should	   be	   more	   precisely	   and	  narrowly	  defined,	  as	  should	  the	  types	  of	  ‘harm’	  that	  one	  can	  allow/design	  robots	  to	  do.	  In	  this	  context,	  implying	  the	  need	  for	  strict	  international	  regulation	  would	  have	  been	  equally	  desirable.	  	  From	  the	  second	  principle	   (PR2)	  we	   learn,	  quite	  appropriately,	   that	   robots	  are	  not	  responsible	  agents:	  Humans	  not	  robots	  are	  responsible	  agents.	  Robots	  should	  
be	   designed;	   operated	   as	   far	   as	   is	   practicable	   to	   comply	   with	   existing	   laws	   and	  
fundamental	  rights	  and	  freedoms,	  including	  privacy.	   In	  as	  much	  as	   this	  principle	  corresponds	   for	  now	   to	  the	  existing	  technological	  AI	  achievements,	   the	  absence	  of	   a	   clear	   working	   definition	   that	   would	   reach	   further	   into	   the	   not	   so	   distant	  future	   -­‐	   as	   a	   number	   of	   AI	   writers	   purport	   (Adam,	   2008;	   Ashrafian,	   2015)	   -­‐	  leaves	   this	   second	   principle	   ill-­‐adapted	   to	   attend	   to	   the	   expected	   speed	   of	  technological	  progress,	  and	  even	  more	  so	   to	  a	  singularity	   threshold	   that	  would	  have	   AI	   surpassing	   the	   human	   intellect	   and	   potentially	   be	   assigned	   increasing	  autonomy.	  	  ‘Advanced	   learning	   robots’,	   ‘intelligent	   machines’,	   AGIs,	   etc.,	   are	   all	   concerned	  with	   these	   principles	   and	   their	   parameters.	   Their	   ‘mechanics’,	   however,	   may	  well	  be	  more	  complex	  than	  the	  law	  or	  the	  normative	  discourse	  can	  handle	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  clear	  definitions.	  Robots	  and	  AI	  machines	  may	  well	  learn	  to	  deal	  with	  ‘exceptions’	   before	   the	   law	   learns	   to	   deal	   with	   ‘differences’.5	  Equally,	   other	  disciplines	   seem	   to	   indicate	   that	   numbers	   (in	   this	   particular	   case,	  ‘programming’)	   may	   well	   be	   more	   than	   just	   that,	   numbers	   being	   inalienably	  paired	  with	   a	  narrative	   propensity	   that,	   one	   could	   say,	  may	  well	   be	   construed	  differently	  by	  the	  machine	  than	  by	  the	  human,	  yet	  may	  still	  be	  construed	  by	  it	  (du	  Sautoy,	   2015).6	  In	   this	   rather	   complex	   context,	   two	   aspects	   are	   certain:	   firstly,	  the	  AI	   scientists	   are	  working	   hard	   at	   blurring	   the	   distinctions	   between	   coding	  and	   consciousness	   and,	   secondly,	   the	   law	  has	   a	   long	   tradition	   of	  working	  with	  both	  narratives	  and	  fictions	  and	  of	  ascribing	  responsibility	  to	  both	  acquired	  and	  assigned	   (moral)	   agency.	   An	   improved	   second	   principle	   should	   acknowledge	  both	  of	  these	  dimensions.	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An	  additional	  element	  refers	  to	  the	  comments	  accompanying	  the	  PR2	  that	  seem	  to	   add	   more	   confusion	   than	   clarity.	   First	   of	   all,	   the	   comments	   voice	   the	  presumption	  that	   ‘no	  one	  is	  likely	  deliberately	  to	  set	  out	  to	  build	  a	  robot	  which	  breaks	   the	   law’,	   the	  only	  reason	  why	  breaking	   the	   law	  might	  happen	  being	   the	  ignorance	   of	   the	   law	   due	   to	   the	   lack	   of	   complex	   legal	   expertise.	   This	  presumption,	   of	   course,	   has	   no	   foundation	   in	   the	   real	   world	   of	   deviance	   and	  defiance,	  as	  revealed	  by	  socio-­‐legal	  studies	  in	  the	  population	  at	   large	  as	  well	  as	  among	  the	  white	  collars	  (Fisher,	  2015;	  Mathews	  &	  Wacker,	  2010).	  Secondly,	  and	  more	   importantly,	   the	  way	   responsibility	   is	   assigned	   through	   these	   comments	  appears	   to	   ignore	   both	   the	   way	   law	   thinks	   (Teubner,	   1989)	   about	   social	  phenomena	  as	  well	  as	  the	  way	  robots	  may	  fail	  to	  ‘achieve	  goals	  and	  desires	  that	  humans	   specify’,	   and	   thus	   may	   contribute	   to	   bringing	   about	   novel	   types	   of	  transgression	  (Bostrom,	  2012).	  	  	  An	  equal	  need	  for	  a	  definitional	  framework	  stems	  from	  PR3:	  Robots	  are	  products.	  
They	   should	   be	   designed	   using	   processes	   which	   assure	   their	   safety	   and	   security.	  This	  principle	  raises	  issues	  of	  legal	  distinctions	  with	  respect	  to	  self-­‐defence;	  tort	  issues,	  assimilation	  of	  responsibility,	  to	  name	  just	  a	  few,	  issues	  that	  depend	  very	  much	   on	   the	   context	   and	   on	   the	   extent	   to	   which,	   as	   mentioned	   above,	   the	  regulator	   will	   be	   willing	   to	   construe	   equivalences	   between	   robots	   and	   other	  types	   of	   tools	   or	   between	   robots	   and	   other	   types	   of	   property	   items	   (Balkin,	  2015).	  	  PR4	   endeavours	   to	   protect	   humans	   from	   being	   sold	   or	   presented	   with	  counterfeited	   emotions	   and	   interactions:	   Robots	   are	   manufactured	   artefacts.	  
They	  should	  not	  be	  designed	  in	  a	  deceptive	  way	  to	  exploit	  vulnerable	  users;	  instead	  
their	  machine	  nature	   should	  be	   transparent.	   Again,	   this	   principle	   raises	   several	  issues.	  The	  ability	  of	  people	  to	  communicate	  with	  sociable	  machines	  is	  one	  of	  the	  avenues	   pursued	   intensely	   in	   the	   AI	   scientific	   community	   (Breazeal,	   2003,	   p.	  129).	  While	  the	  aim	  is	  not	  one	  of	  deceiving,	  creating	  the	  context	  for	  this	  type	  of	  communication	   to	   take	   place	   will	   raise	   many	   regulatory	   problems.	   The	  borderline	  between	  a	  crafty	  illusion	  and	  a	  deceptive	  interface	  can	  easily	  be	  filled	  by	  the	  human	  emotions.	  Part	  of	  what	  we	  are	  after	  in	  creating	  ‘service	  robots’	  that	  will	  read	  bedtime	  stories	  to	  our	  children	  or	  care	  for	  our	  elderly	  disabled	  father,	  is	  emotional	  engagement.	  The	  scientific	  evidence	  appears	  to	  show	  that	  creating	  the	   conditions	   for	   emotional	   engagement	   may	   well	   transcend	   the	   ‘behind	   the	  veil’	   appearance,	   even	  when	   that	  appearance	   remains,	   in	   fact,	   the	  one	  of	  a	   ‘tin’	  (Dautenhahn,	   2007;	   Goodrich	   &	   Schultz,	   2007).	   From	   here	   to	   the	   marketing	  manipulation	  of	  the	  emotional	  engagement	  there	  remain	  just	  a	  few	  steps	  that	  the	  regulatory	   environment	   will	   find	   challenging	   to	   accompany.	   The	   comments	  published	  with	  this	  principle	  rightly	  welcome	  further	  reflection.	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Finally,	  PR5	  addresses	  the	  thorny	  issue	  of	  actual	  legal	  responsibility	  for	  harm	  or	  damage	   produced	   by	   a	   robot:	   The	   person	   with	   legal	   responsibility	   for	   a	   robot	  
should	  be	  attributed.	  This	  principle	  appears	  clear	  enough	  in	  the	  context	  in	  which	  we	  are	  a	  long	  way	  away	  from	  AI	  capable	  of	  technically	  fulfilling	  the	  requirements	  for	   such	   responsibility.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   complex	  components	  and	  fields	  of	  knowledge	  that	  contribute	  to	  the	  make-­‐up	  of	  a	  robot	  -­‐	  as	   indicated	   above	   when	   discussing	   the	   definition	   -­‐	   some	   challenges	   to	   the	  regulatory	   approach	  will	   persist,	   such	   as	   the	   ones	   related	   to	   prising	   apart	   the	  various	   degrees	   of	   responsibility	   when	   things	   go	   wrong.	   Having	   a	   ‘registered	  keeper’,	  bearer	  of	  responsibility,	  is	  only	  part	  of	  the	  solution	  and	  does	  not	  address	  the	  problem	  of	  ‘many	  hands’,	  for	  instance.	  The	  responsibility-­‐bearing	  entity	  will	  require	   further	  reflection,	  as	  will	   the	  type	  of	  harm(s)	   that	  may	  be	  attributed	  to	  such	  entities,	  taking	  into	  account,	  as	  some	  suggest,	  that	  lately,	  for	  the	  first	  time,	  ‘the	   promiscuity	   of	   data’	   can	   be	   shown	   to	   be	   combined	   with	   ‘the	   capacity	   of	  doing	  physical	  harm’	  (Calo,	  2015).	  	  	  	  	  
4.	   Conclusions	  
	  Insofar	  as	  AI	  developments	  are	  concerned,	   it	   is	  quite	   likely	   that	   in	  a	  context	   in	  which	   market	   powers	   and	   scientific	   capability	   deregulation	   share	   substantial	  synergies,	  we	  will	  most	  surely,	  in	  the	  words	  of	  Roy	  Bradbury,	  first	  ‘jump	  off	  the	  cliff	  and	  build	  our	  wings	  on	  the	  way	  down’.	  In	  such	  circumstances,	  what	  one	  can	  do	   is	   to	   make	   sure	   of	   being	   relatively	   prepared	   for	   this	   jump	   by	   already	  interrogating	  and	  problematizing	  our	  relationship	  with	  science	  and	  technology,	  and	   by	   intensifying	   our	   reflection	   on	   living	   with	   robots.	   Addressing	   ‘tools’,	  ‘products’,	   ‘artefacts’	   and	   ‘agents’	  with	   respect	   to	   their	   normative	   implications,	  one	  may	  want	  to	  pay	  heed	  to	  St	  Augustine’s	  reflection	  on	  the	  intricate	  connection	  between	  language	  and	  interpretation	  as	  a	  path	  to	  revealing	  a	  deeper,	  existential	  level	   of	   self-­‐understanding.	   The	  way	  we	   think	   normatively	   about	   human-­‐robot	  
interaction7	  will	   say	   as	  much	   about	   the	   robot	   as	   about	   the	   human.	   To	   borrow	  from	  Gianbattista	  Vico’s	  1725	  New	  Science	  (Vico,	  1744),	  we	  need	  to	  bear	  in	  mind	  that	  our	  thinking	  about	  robots	  is	  rooted	  in	  a	  given	  cultural	  context.	  This	  means	  that,	   in	   reflecting	   about	   the	   normative	   parameters	   of	   leaving	   in	   a	   world	  populated	  with	  robots	  as	  much	  as	  with	  humans,	  the	  social	  scientist	  will	  not	  deal	  with	   a	   field	   of	   idealised	   and	   putatively	   ‘subject-­‐independent	   objects’,	   but	   will	  investigate	   a	  world	   that	   is,	   fundamentally,	   her	   own.	   The	   process	   of	   regulating	  robots	  is,	  therefore,	  a	  process	  of	  self-­‐understanding,	  a	  process	  rooted	  in	  a	  given	  historical	   context	   and	   practice.	   Such	   an	   understanding	   does	   not	   automatically	  culminate	   in	   neat	   normative	   legal	   propositions	   as	   the	   five	   principles	   may	  suggest.	   This	   being	   said,	   we	   acknowledge	   the	   contribution	   that	   the	   EPSRC	  Principles	   of	   Robotics	   bring	   to	   the	   debate,	   as	   an	   initiative	   that	   is	   to	   be	  understood	  as	  a	  heroic,	  normative	   ‘jumping	  off	   the	  cliff’	  moment.	   It	  remains,	  of	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course,	  for	  the	  initiative	  to	  build	  up	  some	  strong	  regulatory	  wings.	  As	  indicated	  in	   these	   reflections,	   part	   of	   the	   required	   strength	   is	   to	   be	   provided	   through	   a	  conceptual	  framework	  and	  definitions	  that	  bring	  clarity	  and	  flexibility.	  	  
References	  	  Adam,	  A.	  (2008).	  Ethics	  for	  Things.	  Ethics	  and	  Information	  Technology,	  10(2–3),	  149–154.	  Ashrafian,	  H.	  (2015).	  Artificial	  Intelligence	  and	  Robot	  Responsibilities:	  Innovating	  Beyond	  Rights.	  Science	  and	  Engineering	  Ethics,	  21(2),	  317–326.	  Balkin,	  J.	  M.	  (2015).	  The	  Path	  of	  Robotics	  Law.	  California	  Law	  Review	  Circuit,	  6,	  45–60.	  Barraza,	  E.	  (2016,	  January	  23).	  How	  Amnesty	  International	  Aims	  to	  Bring	  Technology	  and	  Human	  Rights	  Together.	  SingularityHUB.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://singularityhub.com/2016/01/23/how-­‐amnesty-­‐international-­‐aims-­‐to-­‐bring-­‐technology-­‐and-­‐human-­‐rights-­‐together/	  Bostrom,	  N.	  (2012).	  The	  Superintelligent	  Will:	  Motivation	  and	  Instrumental	  Rationality	  in	  Advanced	  Artificial	  Agents.	  Minds	  and	  Machines,	  22(2),	  71–85.	  Breazeal,	  C.	  (2003).	  Emotion	  and	  Sociable	  Humanoid	  Robots.	  International	  
Journal	  of	  Human-­‐Computer	  Studies,	  59(1–2),	  119–155.	  Brewster,	  S.	  (2014,	  July	  5).	  What	  Is	  a	  Robot?	  The	  Answer	  Is	  Constantly	  Evolving.	  
GIGAOM.	  Retrieved	  from	  https://gigaom.com/2014/07/05/what-­‐is-­‐a-­‐robot-­‐the-­‐answer-­‐is-­‐constantly-­‐evolving/	  Bryson,	  J.	  J.	  (2012).	  The	  Making	  of	  the	  EPSRC	  Principles	  of	  Robotics.	  The	  AISB	  
Quarterly,	  Spring	  2012(133),	  14–15.	  
	   11	  
Calo,	  R.	  (2015).	  Robotics	  and	  the	  Lessons	  of	  Cyberlaw.	  California	  Law	  Review,	  
103,	  513.	  Dautenhahn,	  K.	  (2007).	  Socially	  Intelligent	  Robots:	  Dimensions	  of	  Human–Robot	  Interaction.	  Philosophical	  Transactions	  of	  the	  Royal	  Society	  of	  London	  B:	  
Biological	  Sciences,	  362(1480),	  679–704.	  Deleuze,	  G.	  (2006).	  The	  Fold	  (New	  Edition).	  London ;	  New	  York:	  Continuum.	  Dominey,	  P.	  F.	  (2016,	  May).	  Neural	  Basis	  of	  Semantic	  Representations:	  	  Grounding	  
Meaning	  in	  Sensory-­‐Motor	  Experience	  and	  Narrative	  with	  the	  iCub	  (Robot	  
Cognition	  Lab,	  Stem	  Cell	  &	  Brain	  Research	  Institute,	  Lyon,	  	  France).	  Presented	  at	  the	  AISB	  Annual	  Convention,	  Sheffield,	  UK.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:aOSXPCuXv7YJ:neuroinformatics.usc.edu/wp-­‐content/uploads/2014/02/Dominey_Peter.pdf+&cd=3&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=fr&client=firefox-­‐b	  du	  Sautoy,	  M.	  (2015).	  Narrative	  and	  Proof:	  Two	  Sides	  of	  the	  Same	  Equation?	  Oxford:	  TORCH,	  The	  Oxford	  Research	  Centre	  in	  the	  Humanities.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.torch.ox.ac.uk/narrative-­‐and-­‐proof-­‐two-­‐sides-­‐same-­‐equation-­‐0	  EPSRC.	  (2010,	  September).	  Principles	  of	  robotics:	  Regulating	  Robots	  in	  the	  Real	  World.	  Retrieved	  June	  19,	  2016,	  from	  https://www.epsrc.ac.uk/research/ourportfolio/themes/engineering/activities/principlesofrobotics/	  Fagundes,	  D.	  (2001).	  Note,	  What	  We	  Talk	  About	  When	  We	  Talk	  About	  Persons:	  The	  Language	  of	  a	  Legal	  Fiction.	  Harvard	  Law	  Review,	  114(6),	  1745–1768.	  
	   12	  
Fisher,	  K.	  (2015).	  The	  Psychology	  of	  Fraud:	  What	  Motivates	  Fraudsters	  to	  Commit	  Crime?	  Social	  Science	  Research	  Network.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2596825	  Gevel,	  A.	  J.	  W.	  van	  de,	  &	  Noussair,	  C.	  N.	  (2013).	  The	  Nexus	  between	  Artificial	  
Intelligence	  and	  Economics.	  Springer	  Science	  &	  Business	  Media.	  Goodrich,	  M.	  A.,	  &	  Schultz,	  A.	  C.	  (2007).	  Human-­‐Robot	  Interaction:	  A	  Survey.	  
Foundations	  and	  Trends	  in	  Human-­‐Computer	  Interaction,	  1(3),	  203–275.	  Grady,	  K.	  (2014,	  December	  31).	  Artificial	  Intelligence:	  Be	  Afraid,	  Be	  Very,	  Very	  Afraid	  (Or	  Not).	  SeytLines:	  Changing	  the	  Practice	  of	  Law.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://www.seytlines.com/2014/12/artificial-­‐intelligence-­‐be-­‐afraid-­‐be-­‐very-­‐very-­‐afraid-­‐or-­‐not/	  Kahn,	  P.	  H.,	  Ishiguro,	  H.,	  Kanda,	  T.,	  Freier,	  N.	  G.,	  Severson,	  R.	  L.,	  &	  Miller,	  J.	  (2007).	  What	  Is	  a	  Human?	  Toward	  Psychological	  Benchmarks	  in	  the	  Field	  of	  Human–Robot	  Interaction.	  Interaction	  Studies,	  8(3),	  363–390.	  Knight,	  W.	  (2015,	  August	  3).	  Military	  Robots:	  Armed,	  but	  How	  Dangerous?	  MIT	  
Technology	  Review.	  Retrieved	  from	  https://www.technologyreview.com/s/539876/military-­‐robots-­‐armed-­‐but-­‐how-­‐dangerous/	  Latour,	  B.	  (2002).	  Body,	  Cyborgs	  and	  the	  Politcs	  of	  Incarnation.	  In	  S.	  Sweeney	  &	  I.	  Hodder	  (Eds.),	  The	  Body:	  Darwin	  College	  Lectures	  (pp.	  127–141).	  Latour,	  B.	  (2004).	  How	  to	  Talk	  About	  the	  Body?	  the	  Normative	  Dimension	  of	  Science	  Studies.	  Body	  &	  Society,	  10(2–3),	  205–229.	  Mathews,	  R.,	  &	  Wacker,	  W.	  (2010).	  The	  Deviant’s	  Advantage:	  How	  Fringe	  Ideas	  
Create	  Mass	  Markets.	  New	  York:	  Random	  House.	  
	   13	  
May,	  L.	  (1996).	  Sharing	  Responsibility	  (New	  edition	  1996).	  Chicago:	  University	  Of	  Chicago	  Press.	  Merriam-­‐Webster	  Dictionary.	  (2016).	  Retrieved	  February	  10,	  2016,	  from	  http://www.merriam-­‐webster.com/dictionary/robot	  Merzouki,	  R.,	  Samantaray,	  A.	  K.,	  Pathak,	  P.	  M.,	  &	  Ould	  Bouamama,	  B.	  (2013).	  
Intelligent	  Mechatronic	  Systems.	  London:	  Springer	  London.	  NASA.	  (2015,	  May	  18).	  What	  Is	  Robotics?	  Retrieved	  February	  10,	  2016,	  from	  http://www.nasa.gov/audience/forstudents/k-­‐4/stories/nasa-­‐knows/what_is_robotics_k4.html	  Nemetz,	  P.	  N.	  (2013).	  Business	  and	  the	  Sustainability	  Challenge:	  An	  Integrated	  
Perspective.	  London	  and	  New	  York:	  Routledge.	  Norrie,	  A.	  (1991).	  A	  Critique	  of	  Criminal	  Causation.	  Modern	  Law	  Review,	  54,	  685–701.	  Roser,	  M.	  (2016).	  Technological	  Progress.	  Published	  online	  at	  OurWorldInData.com.	  Institute	  for	  New	  Economic	  Thinking	  at	  the	  Oxford	  Martin	  School	  &	  The	  Nuffield	  Foundation.	  Retrieved	  from	  https://ourworldindata.org/technological-­‐progress/	  Teubner,	  G.	  (1989).	  How	  the	  Law	  Thinks:	  Toward	  a	  Constructivist	  Epistemology	  of	  Law.	  Law	  and	  Society	  Review,	  23(5),	  727–757.	  Vico,	  G.	  (1744).	  The	  New	  Science	  of	  Giambattista	  Vico.	  Cornell	  University	  Press.	  Voiculescu,	  A.	  (2016).	  Human	  Rights	  Beyond	  the	  Human:	  Hermeneutics	  and	  
Normativity	  in	  the	  Age	  of	  the	  Unknown	  (SSRN	  Scholarly	  Paper	  No.	  ID	  2798430)	  (pp.	  1–24).	  Rochester,	  NY:	  Social	  Science	  Research	  Network.	  Retrieved	  from	  https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2798430	  
	   14	  
Voiculescu,	  A.	  (2017).	  Business	  Responsibility	  for	  Human	  Rights	  Violations	  from	  a	  Theoretical	  Perspective:	  Towards	  a	  Moral	  Division	  of	  Labour.	  In	  J.	  D.	  Rendtorff	  (Ed.),	  Perspectives	  on	  Philosophy	  of	  Management	  and	  Business:	  
Including	  a	  Special	  Section	  on	  Business	  and	  Human	  Rights	  (Vol.	  51,	  pp.	  1–22).	  London	  and	  New	  York:	  Springer.	  Williams,	  B.	  (2005).	  Cognitive	  Robotics:	  Syllabus.	  Aeronautics	  and	  Astronautics	  |	  MIT	  OpenCourseWare.	  Retrieved	  from	  http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/aeronautics-­‐and-­‐astronautics/16-­‐412j-­‐cognitive-­‐robotics-­‐spring-­‐2005/syllabus/	  Wilson,	  H.	  J.	  (2015,	  April	  15).	  What	  Is	  a	  Robot,	  Anyway?	  Harvard	  Business	  Review.	  Retrieved	  from	  https://hbr.org/2015/04/what-­‐is-­‐a-­‐robot-­‐anyway	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  author	  would	  like	  to	  thank	  the	  two	  anonymous	  reviewers	  for	  their	  comments,	  the	  Organising	  Committee	  of	  the	  AISB	  2016	  Symposium	  on	  the	  Principles	  of	  Robotics	  for	  the	  invitation	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  EPSRC	  initiative	  and	  the	  Symposium	  participants	  for	  their	  comments	  and	  for	  sharing	  their	  thoughts	  and	  ideas.	  Any	  remaining	  errors	  are	  entirely	  the	  author’s	  responsibility.	  2	  The	  resulting	  EPSRC	  document	  was	  in	  fact	  made	  up	  of	  five	  Principles	  of	  Robotics,	  each	  of	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  'High-­‐Level	  Messages',	  as	  well	  as	  of	  commentaries	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  and	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